Red and Purple Teaming: Why Simulation Beats Assumptions

Your security controls look good on paper. The question worth asking is whether they hold up when someone who thinks like an attacker tests them.

Most organisations have invested in security technology. Firewalls, endpoint detection, SIEM platforms, identity controls. The assumption built into that investment is that because the tools are in place, they are working as intended. Red and purple team exercises exist to test that assumption, and they exist because the assumption is frequently wrong.

The difference between a checklist and a test

Compliance frameworks, audits and standard penetration tests serve an important purpose. They verify that controls exist and that known vulnerabilities are addressed. What they do not reliably answer is whether your security team can detect, respond to and contain a real attack, conducted by a real adversary, using real techniques.

That is the question red teaming is designed to answer.

A red team exercise places a skilled group of offensive security practitioners, operating as a simulated adversary, against your environment with one objective: achieve a defined goal without being detected or stopped. That goal might be accessing sensitive financial data, compromising a privileged account, or demonstrating lateral movement across your network. The red team uses the same tactics, techniques, and procedures that actual threat actors use, mapped against established frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK, rather than a predefined list of test cases.

The result is not a vulnerability report. It is an honest answer to the question your board and your CISO need answered: if a determined adversary targeted us today, how far would they get?

Where purple teaming fits

Red teaming is adversarial by design. The blue team, your internal security operations function, does not know the exercise is happening. That realism is valuable, but it limits what you can learn in a single engagement.

Purple teaming changes the dynamic. Rather than operating in isolation, the offensive and defensive teams work collaboratively. The red team executes an attack technique. The blue team observes, responds and immediately identifies whether their tools detected it, how long detection took, and what gaps exist in their response playbook. Then they fix it, and the red team tries again.

The outcome is accelerated improvement. Instead of receiving a report weeks after an exercise concludes, your security operations team builds detection and response capability in real time, against real attack techniques, with immediate feedback on what works and what does not.

For South African organisations building or maturing a security operations function, purple teaming is one of the most efficient ways to close the gap between having security tools and actually using them effectively.

Why MITRE ATT&CK matters

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is the closest thing the security industry has to a shared language for adversary behaviour. It catalogues the tactics, techniques and procedures used by real threat groups, drawn from observed incidents globally, and organises them into a navigable matrix that both offensive and defensive teams can reference.

When red and purple team exercises are mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, the results become actionable in a way that generic testing cannot match. Instead of knowing that a vulnerability exists, your team knows precisely which adversary techniques your controls can detect, which ones they miss, and where your detection coverage has blind spots.

That specificity matters when you are making investment decisions about your security programme. It is the difference between spending on tools because they appear on a vendor’s recommended list and spending on tools because evidence shows they close a gap that a real adversary would exploit.

What exercises typically reveal

Across red and purple team engagements, certain findings surface consistently. Detection gaps are common, particularly around lateral movement and privilege escalation, where attackers who have already gained a foothold move quietly through an environment using legitimate tools and credentials rather than malware. Living-off-the-land techniques, where attackers use built-in operating system utilities to avoid triggering endpoint detection, frequently go undetected by organisations that have not tuned their tools specifically to look for them.

Response capability is another area where assumptions break down. Many organisations have an incident response plan that has never been tested under realistic conditions. When a simulated attack triggers an alert, the question is not only whether the alert fires, but whether the right person sees it, understands it, and knows what to do next. The gap between a documented process and an operational one is often wider than security teams expect.

Dwell time is a related concern. IBM’s 2025 Cost of a Data Breach Report found that South African organisations took an average of 227 days to identify and contain a breach. That figure reflects how long attackers can operate inside an environment before detection. Red team exercises that simulate extended dwell scenarios, where the objective is to remain undetected while achieving a goal, give organisations a realistic picture of whether their detection capability would catch a patient, methodical adversary or only a noisy one.

The question that red teaming answers

Standard security testing tells you whether your defences are configured correctly. Red and purple teaming tells you whether they actually work.

Those are different questions, and the gap between them is where most breaches happen. Attackers do not follow test scripts. They probe, adapt, pivot and persist. The only reliable way to know whether your organisation can withstand that kind of pressure is to simulate it under controlled conditions, with skilled practitioners who think the way your adversaries do.

A clean penetration test result tells you something useful. A red team that reached its objective undetected tells you something you cannot afford not to know.

Building resilience that holds under pressure

The goal of red and purple teaming is not to embarrass your security team. It is to give them the information and the practice they need to perform when it matters. The organisations that invest in adversary simulation consistently build more capable detection and response functions, make better-informed decisions about where to spend their security budget, and are better positioned to demonstrate to regulators and boards that their security posture reflects real-world resilience rather than compliance theatre.

In a threat environment as active as South Africa’s, the difference between assumption and evidence is not academic. It is the difference between finding out what your security programme can do before an incident, or during one.


SS-Consulting offers Red and Purple Team Exercises and Adversary Emulations using the MITRE ATT&CK Framework, designed to test your defences against realistic attack scenarios. To find out how your organisation performs under pressure, contact us at sales@ss-consulting.co.za